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INTRODUCTION

The combination of the increased number of underwater
mortgages1 and the increased number of bankruptcy filings2 has created at least one new issue in bankruptcy law: can a debtor avoid liability on a lien that was fully secured by collateral in his home at the
outset of the loan, if a subsequent decrease in the value of the collateral (i.e. his home) has caused the lien to become less than fully secured at the time of the bankruptcy filing? This question can arise in
two contexts, each of which follows its own analysis: (1) an attempt
to “strip down” the amount of debt owed on a loan to match the current value of the collateral; or (2) an attempt to “strip off” a loan in its
entirety, when there is no remaining value on the collateral. Additionally, the analysis varies based on the Chapter of the Bankruptcy
Code used for the proceeding.
Individuals filing for bankruptcy typically utilize either Chapter 7 or Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code (the “Code”). 3 The Supreme Court has clearly prohibited stripping down a mortgage in both
Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 proceedings,4 but has remained silent as to
stripping off a mortgage in either Chapter. So far, the Circuit Courts
have agreed that a Chapter 13 debtor may strip off a wholly unse1
Les Christie, More Than 30% of Mortgage Borrowers Still Underwater, CNN MONEY
(May 24, 2012, 5:23AM), http://money.cnn.com/2012/05/24/real_estate/underwatermortgages/index.htm (indicating that nearly one-third of borrowers owe more money on
their mortgage than their home is worth).
2
Compare Business and Nonbusiness Cases Commenced, by Chapter of the Bankruptcy
Code, During the 12-Month Period Ending December 31, 2012, U.S. BANKR. COURTS,
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/BankruptcyStatistics/BankruptcyFilings/2012/12
12_f2.pdf (last visited Mar. 22, 2013) [hereinafter 2012 Bankruptcy Report] (indicating that
approximately 1.2 million bankruptcy proceedings were filed in the federal courts of the
United States in 2012), with Business and Nonbusiness Bankruptcy Cases Commenced, By
Chapter of the Bankruptcy Code, During the Twelve Month Period Ended Dec. 31, 2007,
U.S. BANKR. COURTS http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/BankruptcyStatistics/Bankruptcy
Filings/2007/1207_f2.pdf (last visited Mar. 22, 2013) (indicating that approximately 850,000
bankruptcy proceedings were filed in 2007).
3
2012 Bankruptcy Report, supra note 2 (noting that of the total number of bankruptcy
filings in 2012, 843,545 were filed under Chapter 7, while 366,532 were filed under Chapter
13; therefore 99% of all bankruptcy proceedings during 2012 were filed under either Chapter
7 or Chapter 13).
4
Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 417 (1992) (holding that a Chapter 7 debtor cannot
strip down a partially unsecured mortgage); Nobelman v. Am. Sav. Bank, 508 U.S. 324,
325-26 (1993) (holding that a Chapter 13 debtor cannot strip down a partially undersecured
mortgage).
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cured junior mortgage;5 however, a recent ruling in the Eleventh Circuit created a split as to the issue of whether a Chapter 7 debtor may
strip off a wholly unsecured junior mortgage.6
This Comment discusses the nuances of underwater mortgages and bankruptcy proceedings. Part II provides an overview of the
common types of bankruptcy and the basic terminology related to the
concepts discussed in this Comment. Part III summarizes the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Code as applied to stripping down
of primary mortgages in both Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 proceedings.
Part IV discusses how the Circuit Courts have applied the Supreme
Court’s jurisprudence to the related concept of stripping off in Chapter 7 proceedings. Part IV ultimately concludes that the minority rule
allowing stripping off in Chapter 7 proceedings is the correct view
based on the plain text of the Code. Part V describes how the Circuit
Courts have applied the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence described in
Part III to the related concept of stripping off in Chapter 13 proceedings in order to universally hold that stripping off in Chapter 13 is allowed. Finally, Part VI briefly discusses the conclusions reached in
the earlier sections of this Comment.

5

See First Mariner Bank v. Johnson, 411 B.R. 221, 224 (D. Md. 2009), aff’d sub nom In
re Johnson, 407 Fed. Appx. 713 (4th Cir. 2011) (unpublished, per curium); Lane v. W. Interstate Bancorp (In re Lane), 280 F.3d 663, 665 (6th Cir. 2002); Zimmer v. PSB Lending
Corp. (In re Zimmer), 313 F.3d 1220, 1227 (9th Cir. 2002); Pond v. Farm Specialist Realty
(In re Pond), 252 F.3d 122, 127 (2d Cir. 2001); Tanner v. FirstPlus Fin., Inc. (In re Tanner),
217 F.3d 1357, 1360 (11th Cir. 2000); McDonald v. Master Fin., Inc. (In re McDonald), 205
F.3d 606, 615 (3d Cir. 2000); Bartee v. Tara Colony Homeowners Ass’n (In re Bartee), 212
F.3d 277, 296 (5th Cir. 2000); Fisette v. Keller (In re Fisette), 455 B.R. 177, 187 (B.A.P. 8th
Cir. 2011); Domestic Bank v. Mann (In re Mann), 249 B.R. 831, 840 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2000)
(all holding that a Chapter 13 debtor may strip off a wholly unsecured junior mortgage during a bankruptcy proceeding).
6
Compare McNeal v. GMAC Mortg., LLC (In re McNeal), 477 F. App’x 562, 564-65
(11th Cir. 2012) (unpublished opinion) (holding that a Chapter 7 debtor may strip off a wholly unsecured junior mortgage), with, e.g., Ryan v. Homecomings Fin. Network, 253 F.3d
778, 783 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding that a Chapter 7 debtor may not strip off a wholly unsecured junior mortgage).
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OVERVIEW OF RELEVANT BANKRUPTCY LAW
A.

Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 Filings in the Wake of
the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer
Protection Act of 2005

Individuals who file for bankruptcy typically do so under either Chapter 7 (“Liquidation Bankruptcy”) or Chapter 13 (“Individual
Debt Adjustment”) of the Code.7 The Chapter 13 debtor must create
a “reorganization plan,” which aims to pay off debts with future earnings.8 The debtor must comply with the reorganization plan, attend
educational courses, and fulfill other requirements in order to obtain
discharge of his debt.9
The Chapter 13 debtor must pay back varying degrees of his
debt based on the categorization of the creditor’s claim as priority,
secured or unsecured.10 “Priority claims are those granted special status by the bankruptcy law, such as most taxes and the costs of bankruptcy proceedings.”11 These claims must be paid in full, unless the
creditor agrees to accept less than full payment.12 Secured claims are
those which are secured by collateral in real property.13 “If the debtor
wants to keep the collateral securing a particular claim, then the plan
must provide that the holder of the secured claim receive at least the
value of the collateral,” or, in some cases, “full payment of the

7

2012 Bankruptcy Report, supra note 2 (99% of all bankruptcy filings during 2012 were
filed under either Chapter 7 or Chapter 13); see also Bankruptcy Basics, Chapter 7: Liquidation Under the Bankruptcy Code, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/Bankruptcy/
BankruptcyBasics/Chapter7.aspx (last visited Mar. 22, 2013) [hereinafter Chapter 7 Basics]
(describing Chapter 7 bankruptcy as liquidation); Bankruptcy Basics, Chapter 13: Individual
Debt Adjustment, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/Bankruptcy/BankruptcyBasics/
Chapter13.aspx (last visited Mar. 22, 2013) [hereinafter Chapter 13 Basics] (describing
Chapter 13 bankruptcy as individual debt adjustment).
8
Chapter 13 Basics, supra note 7.
9
Id.
10
Id.
11
Id.; see also 11 U.S.C. § 507 (Supp. IV 2010) (describing the types of claims that are
entitled to priority).
12
Chapter 13 Basics, supra note 7; see also 11 U.S.C. § 1322(a)(2) (Supp. IV 2010)
(“The plan . . . shall provide for the full payment . . . of all claims entitled to priority [status] . . . unless the holder of a particular claim agrees to a different treatment of such
claim.”).
13
Chapter 13 Basics, supra note 7.
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debt.”14 Unsecured claims are those which are not priority claims
and which are not secured by any particular interest in the debtor’s
property.15 Unsecured claims do not need to be paid back in full as
long as the “debtor will pay all projected ‘disposable income’ over an
‘applicable commitment period,’ and as long as unsecured creditors
receive at least as much under the plan as they would receive if the
debtor’s assets were liquidated under Chapter 7.”16 If the debtor
complies with all of his obligations throughout the reorganization period, the debtor will receive a discharge from “all debts provided for
by the plan.”17
Conversely, a Chapter 7 debtor must place all of her nonexempt property into the hands of a bankruptcy trustee.18 The trustee
liquidates the debtor’s property and distributes the proceeds to creditors in a certain order of priority based on the type of each claim
held.19 Creditors who hold priority claims are paid first and the remaining funds are then distributed through the other classes of
claims; the last person paid is the debtor herself.20 The Chapter 7
debtor’s concerns typically center on “retain[ing] exempt property
and receiv[ing] a discharge that covers as many debts as possible”
because the debtor will not receive any distribution from the liquidation unless and until all other classes of claims have been fully repaid.21
In 2005, “Congress enacted the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention
and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (“BAPCPA”) to correct perceived abuses to the bankruptcy system.”22 Congress wanted to ensure that only honest debtors, who utilized bankruptcy as “a last re14

Id.
Id.
16
Id.; see also 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4) (Supp. IV 2010) (“[T]he court shall confirm a plan
if . . . the value . . . of property to be distributed under the plan on account of each allowed
unsecured claim is not less than the amount that would be paid on such claim if the estate of
the debtor were liquidated under chapter 7 . . . .”).
17
Chapter 13 Basics, supra note 7.
18
Chapter 7 Basics, supra note 7.
19
Id. (“Under § 726 of [the Code], there are six classes of claims; and each class must be
paid in full before the next lower class is paid anything.”); see also 11 U.S.C. § 726(a)
(Supp. IV 2010) (describing the six classes of claims and the order of priority for distribution
in liquidation bankruptcy).
20
11 U.S.C. § 726(a).
21
Chapter 7 Basics, supra note 7.
22
Mark A. Redmiles, The Supreme Court Interprets the Means Test, AM. BANKR. INST. J.
18 (Apr. 2011).
15
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sort” to receive a fresh start from “severe financial distress,” could
file for bankruptcy, and prevent use of the system as “a head start for
individuals who could repay some or all of their debts but preferred
not to.”23 Additionally, portions of the BAPCPA were designed to
limit the availability of Chapter 7 bankruptcy in order to prevent
debtors from using Chapter 7 to clear debts which they could afford
to repay through a Chapter 13 plan.24 However, in 2012, Chapter 7
bankruptcy filings were filed at more than double the rate of Chapter
13 filings.25 Thus, Chapter 7 remains the most common mechanism
for an individual to file for bankruptcy.
B.

Stripping Off and Stripping Down

Historically, a creditor who held a debt secured by collateral
in the debtor’s primary residence had a relatively safe investment because home values were typically expected to rise.26 As long as the
value of the collateral (the home) remained greater than the debt
owed, the debt remained fully secured by the value of the home.
However, as housing prices took a plunge in recent years, some home
mortgages became unsecured when the value of the home dropped to
an amount less than the amount owed on the mortgage.27 Consider,
for example, a buyer who purchased a home valued at $200,000 by
taking a primary mortgage in the amount of $180,000 and a secondary mortgage in the amount of $20,000. Both mortgages were fully
secured by the value of the home at the time the home was purchased
and the mortgages were created. Assume that shortly after the purchase, the buyer filed for bankruptcy before having owned the home
for enough time to make any significant contribution to the principal
of the mortgage. If the real estate market had fluctuated such that, at
the time of filing for bankruptcy, the buyer’s home was only valued
23

Id.
Jeanne Sahadi, The New Bankruptcy Law and You, CNN MONEY (Oct. 17 2005, 12:17
PM) http://money.cnn.com/2005/10/17/pf/debt/bankruptcy_law/index.htm.
25
2012 Bankruptcy Report, supra note 2.
26
See, e.g., GILLETTE EDMUNDS & JIM KEENE, RETIRE ON THE HOUSE: USING REAL ESTATE
TO SECURE YOUR RETIREMENT 1 (2006) (discussing an optimistic view of the real estate
market, one in which one can possibly expect to retire on home equity alone).
27
Jake Miller, Issue Brief: Housing, CBS NEWS (Oct. 1, 2012, 12:00 PM),
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-505103_162-57523544/issue-brief-housing/ (describing the
steady decline in home values in recent years, stating that “[i]n 2008, the bottom fell out, and
housing prices plunged nationwide”).
24
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at $160,000, then at the time of the bankruptcy filing the amount
owed on the primary mortgage alone exceeded the total value of the
home. Furthermore, there would be no collateral left to secure any
portion of the secondary mortgage. Therefore, at the time of the
bankruptcy filing, the primary mortgage would be considered partially unsecured, while the secondary mortgage would be considered
wholly unsecured.
The phenomenon discussed above has created the bankruptcy
concepts of “stripping off” and “stripping down.” Stripping down refers to the debtor’s attempt to void the unsecured portion of a partially unsecured debt.28 In the above example, the debtor would try to
strip down his primary mortgage from $180,000 to $160,000 because,
at the time of bankruptcy filing, the collateral was only valued at
$160,000. Stripping off refers to voiding a debt (usually a junior lien)
that is wholly unsecured at the time of bankruptcy filing. 29 In the
above example, the debtor would attempt to strip off the secondary
mortgage in its entirety, because the amount owed on the primary
mortgage alone ($180,000) exceeds the entire value of the collateral
($160,000), leaving no collateral to secure any portion of the secondary mortgage.
The Supreme Court has disallowed the practice of stripping
down in both Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceedings,30
but has remained silent as to the practice of stripping off in both types
of proceedings. Until recently, the few circuit courts that ruled on the
issue held that a Chapter 7 debtor may not strip off a wholly unsecured junior mortgage.31 However, the Eleventh Circuit recently
28
See, e.g., Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 412 (1992) (discussing a debtor’s attempt to
“strip down” a lien when the value of the collateral was less than the amount of the creditor’s
claim).
29
See, e.g., Ryan v. Homecomings Fin. Network, 253 F.3d 778, 779 (4th Cir. 2001) (discussing a debtor’s attempt to “strip off” a junior lien when the primary mortgage exceeded
the value of the home).
30
Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 417 (holding that a Chapter 7 debtor cannot strip down the value
of an outstanding mortgage debt to match the value of the underlying collateral); Nobelman
v. Am. Sav. Bank, 508 U.S. 324, 325-26 (1993) (holding that a Chapter 13 debtor cannot
strip down the value of a mortgage debt to match the value of the underlying collateral).
31
Talbert v. City Mortg. Servs. (In re Talbert), 344 F.3d 555, 556 (6th Cir. 2003) (“[W]e
hold that a Chapter 7 debtor may not use § 506 to ‘strip off’ an allowed junior lien where the
senior lien exceeds the fair market value of the real property in question.”); Ryan, 253 F.3d
at 779 (“[W]e hold that a debtor may not strip off an unsecured but allowed lien pursuant to
Section 506(d).”); Laskin v. First Nat’l Bank of Keystone (In re Laskin), 222 B.R. 872, 876
(B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1998) (“Section 506 was intended to facilitate valuation and disposition of
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broke ranks and created the minority view, being the first Circuit to
hold that it is permissible to strip off a wholly unsecured junior mortgage during a Chapter 7 proceeding.32 Courts have reached the exact
opposite conclusion with respect to Chapter 13 proceedings, with a
distinct majority of courts holding that a wholly unsecured junior
mortgage can be stripped off during a Chapter 13 proceeding. 33 The
reasons for the difference in treatment of unsecured junior mortgages
in each Chapter will be discussed in Parts IV and V infra.
III.

STRIPPING DOWN AND THE SUPREME COURT
A.

Chapter 7: Dewsnup v. Timm34

In the early 1990s, a split developed in the circuit courts as to
whether a primary mortgage could be stripped down to the value of
the underlying collateral in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding. 35 In
1992, the Supreme Court settled this issue in the case Dewsnup v.
Timm.36 In Dewsnup, Chapter 7 debtors had an outstanding debt of
approximately $120,000—an amount which exceeded the fair market

property in the reorganization chapters of the Code, not to confer an additional avoiding
power on a Chapter 7 debtor.”).
32
McNeal v. GMAC Mortg., LLC (In re McNeal), 477 F. App’x 562, 564-65 (11th Cir.
2012) (unpublished opinion) (holding that a Chapter 7 debtor may strip off a wholly unsecured junior mortgage).
33
See First Mariner Bank v. Johnson, 411 B.R. 221, 224 (D. Md. 2009), aff’d sub nom
First Mariner Bank v. Johnson (In re Johnson), 407 Fed. App’x 713 (4th Cir. 2011) (unpublished, per curium); Lane v. W. Interstate Bancorp (In re Lane), 280 F.3d 663, 665 (6th
Cir. 2002); Zimmer v. PSB Lending Corp. (In re Zimmer), 313 F.3d 1220, 1227 (9th Cir.
2002); Pond v. Farm Specialist Realty (In re Pond), 252 F.3d 122, 127 (2d Cir. 2001); Tanner v. FirstPlus Fin., Inc. (In re Tanner), 217 F.3d 1357, 1360 (11th Cir. 2000); McDonald v.
Master Fin., Inc. (In re McDonald), 205 F.3d 606, 615 (3d Cir. 2000); Bartee v. Tara Colony
Homeowners Ass’n (In re Bartee), 212 F.3d 277, 296 (5th Cir. 2000); Fisette v. Keller (In re
Fisette), 455 B.R. 177, 187 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2011); Domestic Bank v. Mann (In re Mann),
249 B.R. 831, 840 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2000) (all holding that a Chapter 13 debtor could strip off
a wholly unsecured junior mortgage during a bankruptcy proceeding).
34
502 U.S. 410.
35
Compare, e.g., Dewsnup v. Timm (In re Dewsnup), 908 F.2d 588, 593 (10th Cir. 1990)
(prohibiting strip down in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding), aff’d sub nom. Dewsnup v.
Timm, 502 U.S. 410, with, e.g., Gaglia v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 889 F.2d 1304,
1308 (3d Cir. 1989) (allowing strip down in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding) abrogated
by Dewsnup, 502 U.S. 410.
36
502 U.S. 410.
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value of the property acting as collateral on the loan.37 The debtors
argued that because the amount of the lien exceeded the value of the
collateral, the lien should be reduced such that the outstanding debt
would equal the fair market value of the land.38 The Court stated the
issue as whether “a debtor [may] ‘strip down’ a creditor’s lien on real
property to the value of the collateral, as judicially determined, when
that value is less than the amount of the claim secured by the lien?”39
The Court held that stripping down under these circumstances was
not permissible, based on the plain text of the statute and supported
by legislative intent.40
1.

Statutory Interpretation

Prior to the Supreme Court’s holding in Dewsnup, Chapter 7
debtors relied on the interplay between § 506(a) and § 506(d) in order
to justify stripping down of an undersecured mortgage. 41 Section
506(a) allows a debtor to bifurcate a lien into secured and unsecured
components,42 while section 506(d) allows a debtor to void most
claims that are not “allowed secured claims.”43 Therefore, preDewsnup debtors argued that the plain text of § 506(a) allowed a
debtor to split his mortgage lien into secured and unsecured components and § 506(d) allowed the debtor to void the unsecured portion.44 This plain text argument was rejected by the Court.45
In Dewsnup, the debtors carefully crafted their argument in
favor of stripping down by reading § 506(a) and (d) of the bankruptcy

37

Id. at 413.
Id.
39
Id. at 412.
40
Id. at 417.
41
E.g., Gaglia v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 889 F.2d 1304, 1306 (3d Cir. 1989), abrogated by Dewsnup, 502 U.S. 410.
42
11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (2006) (“An allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on property in which the estate has an interest . . . is a secured claim to the extent of the value of such
creditor’s interest in the estate’s interest in such property, or to the extent of the amount subject to setoff, as the case may be, and is an unsecured claim to the extent that the value of
such creditor’s interest or the amount so subject to setoff is less than the amount of such allowed claim.”).
43
Id. § 506(d) (“To the extent that a lien secures a claim against the debtor that is not an
allowed secured claim, such lien is void . . . .”).
44
E.g., Gaglia, 889 F.2d at 1306.
45
Dewsnup, 502 U.S. 410.
38
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code as complementary provisions.46 The debtors argued that §
506(a) could be used to bifurcate allowed claims into secured and unsecured claims; then § 506(d) could be used to void any claim which
was not an allowed, secured claim under § 506(a).47 On the other
hand, the creditor argued that within § 506(d), “the words [allowed
and secured] should be read term-by-term to refer to any claim that is
first, allowed, and second secured.”48 Therefore, the creditor concluded that § 506(d) could not be used to void any amount of the lien,
because the lien itself was, “ ‘allowed’ pursuant to §502 of the Code
and [was] secured by a lien with recourse to the underlying collateral . . . .”49
The Court adopted the interpretation of the creditor, reasoning
that “§ 506(d) does not allow [debtors] to ‘strip down’ [a creditor’s]
lien, because [a creditor’s] claim is secured by a lien and has been
fully allowed pursuant to § 502.”50 The Court observed that the statutory text is ambiguous on this point, but looked to legislative intent to
adopt the interpretation that § 506(a) should be read separately from
§ 506(d).51 The Court favored the creditor’s interpretation of the ambiguity, as this interpretation was most consistent with pre-Code
treatment of these types of liens.52
2.

Legislative Intent

The creditor argued that prior to the enactment of the presentday versions of § 506(a) and (d), liens of the type in question passed
through bankruptcy unaffected; therefore, absent clear legislative intent to the contrary, this long-standing practice should not be disturbed.53 The Court agreed with this argument, pointing to earlier jurisprudence of the Court indicating that a bankruptcy discharge
destroys only in personam liability against the debtor, while leaving

46
Brief for Petitioner at *14 Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410 (1992) (No. 90-741); see
also 11 U.S.C. § 506.
47
Brief for Petitioner at *14 Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410 (1992) (No. 90-741).
48
Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 415.
49
Id.
50
Id. at 417.
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
Brief for Respondent at *27 Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410 (1992) (No. 90-741).
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in rem liability intact.54 The Court seemingly adopted the creditor’s
observation that “there [was] nothing in the Code’s legislative history
that reflect[ed] any intent to alter that law.”55 The ambiguity in the
text itself, combined with the lack of language within the legislative
history indicating intent to depart from the pre-Code treatment of these types of liens, caused the Court to conclude that it was “not convinced that Congress intended to depart from the pre-Code rule that
liens pass through bankruptcy unaffected.”56
3.

Implications for Similar Scenarios

While the Dewsnup court was clear in its holding with respect
to an undersecured primary mortgage in a Chapter 7 proceeding, it is
difficult to determine the breadth of its holding with respect to similar, but not identical, fact situations. The Court carefully limited its
holding to the case before it, expressly stating that:
Hypothetical applications that come to mind and those
advanced at oral argument illustrate the difficulty of
interpreting the statute in a single opinion that would
apply to all possible fact situations. We therefore focus upon the case before us and allow other facts to
await their legal resolution on another day.57
These two sentences provide significant support for the minority of courts that have held that Dewsnup does not apply to the
similar, but not identical, issue of stripping off a wholly unsecured
junior mortgage.58 The Court was careful to expressly limit the holding to a very specific fact pattern; the express language of the opinion
indicates that courts need not overturn other contrary rules in similar
situations based on the Dewsnup holding.59 Nonetheless, a majority
of courts have found Dewsnup to be controlling precedent when
54
Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 418 (discussing Johnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S. 78, 84
(1991)).
55
Id. at 416.
56
Id. at 417.
57
Id. at 416-17.
58
E.g., In re Lavelle, No. 09-72389-478, 2009 WL 4043089 at *4 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. Nov.
19, 2009) (quoting above two sentences from Dewsnup in reaching the conclusion that
Dewsnup is not controlling in similar, but not identical, factual situations such as stripping
off), overruled by Wachovia Mortg. v. Smoot, 478 B.R. 555 (E.D.N.Y. 2012).
59
Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 416-17.
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faced with the issue of stripping off a wholly unsecured junior mortgage, as discussed in Part IV.A. infra.
B.

Chapter 13: Nobelman v. American Savings Bank60

When filing for bankruptcy under Chapter 13 of the Code, the
debtor must create a reorganization plan with the goal of repayment
of certain debts with “future earnings or other future income.”61 Section 1322(b) of the Code describes the parameters of a reorganization
plan and provides that the debtor’s plan may “modify the rights of
holders of secured claims.”62 Therefore, the issue of stripping down
an undersecured mortgage, follows an entirely different analysis in a
Chapter 13 case than in a Chapter 7 case, because § 1322 is available
as a mechanism to modify the rights of certain secured creditors for
Chapter 13 debtors but not for Chapter 7 debtors.63
Section 1322(b)(2) sets out a general rule that the rights of secured creditors may be modified as part of a debt reorganization
plan.64
However, immediately following this rule is the
antimodification exception, which prohibits modifications of rights of
claimants who hold a debt secured only by the debtor’s primary residence.65 The question in a Chapter 13 proceeding, therefore, is not
only whether the claim is an “allowed secured claim” under § 506,
but also whether such a claim falls within the antimodification exception stated in § 1322(b)(2).66
In Nobelman, the facts were similar to Dewsnup; however in
Nobelman, the debtors filed their petition under Chapter 13 and requested stripping down of the mortgage as part of a reorganization
plan created pursuant to § 1322,67 while in Dewsnup, the debtors had
filed their petition under Chapter 7 and requested stripping down of

60

508 U.S. 324 (1993).
11 U.S.C. § 1322(a)(1) (Supp. IV 2010).
62
Id. § 1322(b)(2).
63
Compare, e.g., Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 411-13 (determining whether § 506 allows strip
down in Chapter 7 proceeding), with, e.g., Nobelman, 508 U.S. at 325-26 (determining
whether § 1322 allows strip down in Chapter 13 proceedings).
64
11. U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2).
65
Id.
66
E.g., Nobelman, 508 U.S. at 332 (finding that debtor could not strip down mortgage because antimodification exception applied).
67
Id. at 326.
61
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the mortgage pursuant to § 506(d).68 In Nobelman, the debtors argued that the antimodification protection of 1322(b)(2) applied “only
to the extent the mortgagee holds a ‘secured claim’ in the debtor’s
residence and that [the court] must first look to § 506(a) to determine
the value of the mortgagee’s ‘secured claim.’ ”69 The debtors further
argued that “[u]nder this view, the bank is the holder of a ‘secured
claim’ only in the amount of . . . the value of the collateral property.”70 Therefore, the debtors concluded that § 1322(b)(2) should allow a debtor to strip down an undersecured mortgage in a Chapter 13
proceeding.71
The Court disagreed with the debtors’ arguments, and instead
determined that § 1322 did not allow a debtor to strip down an
undersecured mortgage.72 The Court focused heavily on the precise
terminology used in the statute, and noted that § 1322 speaks to modification of “rights” of the creditor, rather than modification of
“claims” of the creditor.73 Absent a definition of the term “rights” in
the Code, the Court determined that “Congress ha[d] ‘left the determination of property rights in the assets of a bankrupt’s estate to state
law,’ since such ‘[p]roperty interests are created and defined by state
law.’ ”74 The rights of the mortgagee, therefore, were deemed to be
those rights set out in the mortgage instrument, which, as the Court
noted, typically include “the right to repayment of the principal in
monthly installments over a fixed term at specified adjustable rates of
interest . . . .”75 Therefore, in Nobelman, the creditor’s rights were
protected by the antimodification exception, because the creditor still
held a claim secured by collateral in the debtors’ primary residence,
regardless of the fact that the value of the collateral was less than the
amount of the creditor’s claim.76 The Court concluded that stripping
down was not allowed, because modification of the amount of the
68

Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 411-412, 413.
Nobelman, 502 U.S. at 328.
70
Id.
71
Id.
72
Id. at 332.
73
Id. at 328.
74
Nobelman, 502 U.S. at 329 (second alteration in original) (quoting Butner v. United
States, 440 U.S. 48, 54-55 (1979)).
75
Id. (“These are the rights that were ‘bargained for by the mortgagor and the mortgagee,’
and are rights protected from modification by § 1322(b)(2).”).
76
Id. at 331.
69
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mortgage principal would be a modification of a right of a creditor
holding a claim secured by an interest in the debtors’ principal residence—precisely the type of modification disallowed by §
1322(b)(2).77
Although the majority focused purely on the language of §
1322 in reaching its holding, Justice Stevens discussed the policy
supporting the majority opinion in his concurring opinion.78 Stevens
questioned why Congress would provide more protection for a mortgagee holding a lien secured by collateral in a debtor’s primary residence than for any other creditor holding a lien secured by collateral
in other real or personal property.79 Stevens noted that Congress likely provided more protection to mortgagees of primary residences in
order to “encourage the flow of capital into the home lending market.”80
Therefore, Nobelman provides two major rationales for prohibiting stripping down of a mortgage on a debtor’s primary residence in a Chapter 13 proceeding. First, the plain text of § 1322
speaks to protection of creditor’s “rights” as to a claim secured by a
debtor’s primary mortgage.81 Modification of the amount of the principal is a modification of the “right” of the creditor and therefore is
prohibited by the antimodificaiton exception at § 1322(b)(2). 82 Second, Congress intended to protect mortgagees from modification
under Chapter 13 in order to encourage more lending in the residential real estate market.83 The result of Nobelman is that the
antimodification exception found within § 1322(b)(2) prohibits a
debtor from modifying the rights of a creditor with respect to a lien
that is partially or wholly secured by the debtor’s primary residence.84

77

Id. (noting that the terms of the mortgage instrument include the amount of the principal, the term of the loan, the interest rate and the monthly payment, and that modification of
any of these terms would be an impermissible modification of creditor’s rights).
78
Id. at 332 (Stevens, J., concurring).
79
Nobelman, 508 U.S. at 332 (Stevens, J., concurring).
80
Id.
81
Id. at 328 (majority opinion).
82
Id. at 332.
83
Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
84
Nobelman, 508 U.S. at 332 (majority opinion).
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Conclusions of Dewsnup and Nobelman

The Supreme Court has, therefore, banned the practice of
stripping down undersecured mortgages in both Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 proceedings.85 This means that if there is any amount of value
in the home that is acting as collateral for the mortgage, even just one
penny, the mortgage may not be stripped down to match the value of
the home. In order to reach this conclusion, the Court’s primary consideration was the precise textual meaning of the applicable statutes
within the Code.86 The Court also turned to legislative intent to aid in
its interpretation and to provide support for its plain text conclusions.87 These same principles of interpretation will be applied to the
related concept of mortgage strip off in Parts IV and V infra.
IV.

STRIPPING OFF AND CHAPTER 7
A.

Majority View: Stripping Off Is Not Allowed

Courts have struggled to determine whether Dewsnup applies
in full force when a debtor attempts to strip off a junior lien that has
become wholly unsecured by virtue of depreciation of the value of
the home.88 In such cases, the debtor’s residence is typically subject
to two liens: (1) a primary mortgage which, by itself, exceeds the
value of the home; and (2) a secondary mortgage (the junior lien), for
which there is no remaining value on the home to act as collateral
once the primary mortgage is satisfied.89 While courts are split, a distinct majority of courts have found that Dewsnup prohibits stripping
85

Id. at 325-26 (holding that §1322(b)(2) disallows strip down of a mortgage in Chapter
13 proceeding); Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 417 (1992) (disallowing strip down of a
mortgage in Chapter 7 proceeding).
86
Nobelman, 508 U.S. at 328 (focusing on the use of the term “rights” in the plain text of
the statute); Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 415, 417 (concluding that “the better of the several approaches” to interpretation involves reading each term in the statute separately).
87
Nobelman, 508 U.S. at 332 (Stevens, J., concurring) (reconciling plain text interpretation with legislative intent to increase flow of lending into home market); Dewsnup, 502
U.S. at 417 (considering Congressional intent in light of historical treatment of similar liens).
88
See generally, e.g., Laskin v. First Nat’l Bank of Keystone (In re Laskin), 222 B.R. 872
(B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1998) (court considers application of Dewsnup when Chapter 7 debtor seeks
to strip off wholly unsecured junior lien).
89
E.g., id. at 873 (debtors’ residence subject to two mortgages, the primary mortgage
alone exceeds the value of the home).
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off a wholly unsecured junior mortgage, just as it prohibits stripping
down a partially unsecured primary mortgage.90
1.

Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel:
Laskin v. First National Bank of Keystone
(In re Laskin)91

The Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel92 was the first
post-Dewsnup appellate court to interpret § 506(d) in the context of
stripping off a lien attached to real property.93 In Laskin, the debtors
held property that was subject to two liens: (1) an undersecured primary mortgage; and (2) a wholly unsecured junior lien.94 The debtors sought to strip off the wholly unsecured junior lien during their
Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding.95
In order to escape Dewsnup’s prohibition on lien stripping,
the debtors argued that their lien was entirely unlike the lien at issue
in Dewsnup because their lien was wholly, rather than partially, unsecured at the time of the bankruptcy filing.96 The debtors reasoned
that the Dewsnup holding was a narrow holding; one that applied only to a debtor’s attempt to strip down a partially secured lien. 97 The
debtors concluded that the Dewsnup holding, therefore, had no bearing on their attempt to strip off their junior mortgage, because their

90

E.g., Talbert v. City Mortg. Servs. (In re Talbert), 344 F.3d 555, 556 (6th Cir. 2003)
(“Because the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Dewsnup . . . applies with equal force and logic
to the issue at hand, we hold that a Chapter 7 debtor may not use § 506 to ‘strip off’ an allowed junior lien . . . .”); Ryan v. Homecomings Fin. Network, 253 F.3d 778, 779 (4th Cir.
2001) (“Because we find that the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Dewsnup . . . is equally applicable to ‘strip offs’ as to ‘strip downs’, [sic] we hold that a debtor may not strip off an unsecured but allowed lien . . . .”); Laskin, 222 B.R. at 875 (“[W]e conclude that Dewsnup nevertheless bars the relief debtors seek.”).
91
222 B.R. 872.
92
To date, five circuits have established Bankruptcy Appellate Panels (BAPs) which are
“unit[s] of the federal courts of appeals” having jurisdiction over “[a]ppeals from dispositive
orders of bankruptcy judges . . . with further appeal as of right to the court of appeals for the
circuit.” Courts of Appeals: Bankruptcy Appellate Panels, UNITED STATES COURTS,
http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/UnderstandingtheFederalCourts/CourtofAppeals/Ba
nkruptcyAppellatePanels.aspx (last visited Mar. 22, 2013).
93
Laskin, 222 B.R. 872.
94
Id. at 873.
95
Id. at 874.
96
Id.
97
Id.
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junior mortgage was wholly unsecured.98 Instead, the debtors equated their case with numerous other cases where a debtor sought to
strip off a wholly unsecured junior mortgage.99 The debtors cited
numerous cases in which other courts had allowed a Chapter 13
debtor to strip off a wholly unsecured junior lien, and urged the court
to adopt the view of these courts in their Chapter 7 proceeding.100
However, this argument was fatally flawed because of the debtors’
exclusive reliance on Chapter 13 cases for support.101 These cases
were easily distinguished because in each Chapter 13 case the strip
off had been allowed pursuant to § 1322(b)(2)—a provision of the
Code which does not apply to a Chapter 7 debtor.102 Therefore, the
debtors had failed to provide any legal support for their contention
that a debtor should be allowed to strip off a wholly unsecured junior
lien during a Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding.103
Additionally, the court noted (although the debtors had neglected to) that there were at least two post-Dewsnup bankruptcy
courts that had allowed a Chapter 7 debtor to strip off a wholly unsecured junior lien.104 However, the court declined to follow these
courts, reasoning that the analysis used by these courts, “reverse[d]
the statutory process,” as § 506(d) could not, by itself, void a lien
which was otherwise allowed and secured.105 The court found that
the same three policy rationales that provided support for Dewsnup’s
prohibition on stripping down similarly provided support for a prohibition on stripping off: (1) consistency with the historical practice of
allowing these types of liens to pass through bankruptcy unaffected;
(2) respect for the agreement between the mortgagor and mortgagee
which allows the lien to remain with the property until foreclosure;
and (3) prevention of a windfall for the debtor by allowing any increase in the value of the property prior to the time of foreclosure to
accrue in the favor of the creditor.106 Therefore, the court concluded
that the debtors could not strip off their junior lien because Dewsnup
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106

Laskin, 222 B.R. at 875.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Laskin, 222 B.R. at 873 (affirming denial of debtors’ motion for lack of case law).
Id. at 876.
Id.
Id.
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prevented a debtor from stripping down or off any lien attached to the
debtor’s residence, regardless of whether the lien was partially or
wholly unsecured.107
2.

Fourth Circuit: Ryan v. Homecomings
Financial Network108

In Ryan, the debtors sought to strip off a wholly unsecured
junior mortgage during their Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding.109
The debtors argued that Dewsnup did not prevent them from stripping
off their unsecured junior lien because Dewsnup prohibited the practice of lien stripping only where the lien in question was at least partially secured by equity in the debtor’s residence.110 Alternatively,
the debtors argued that Nobelman provided support for their contention that a wholly unsecured junior lien could be stripped off during a
Chapter 7 proceeding.111
The Fourth Circuit disagreed with both of the debtors’ argu112
ments.
First, the court determined that Dewsnup was indistinguishable from Ryan, stating:
[W]e discern no principled distinction to be made between the case sub judice and that decided in
Dewsnup. The Court’s reasoning in Dewsnup is
equally relevant and convincing in a case like ours
where a debtor attempts to strip off, rather than merely
strip down, an approved but unsecured lien.113
107

Id.
253 F.3d 778 (4th Cir. 2001).
109
Id. at 779.
110
Id. at 781.
111
Id. at 782. Specifically, the debtors argued that Nobelman prohibited lien stripping
under § 1322 only when the claim was “secured by equity in a debtor’s principal residence.”
Brief for Appellants at *11 Ryan v. Homecomings Fin. Network, 253 F.3d 778 (4th Cir.
2001) (No. 00-2137). This argument is barely addressed by the court, however as noted by
the creditors, it is clearly misguided, because § 1322 has no bearing on a Chapter 7 case; rather a Chapter 7 debtor needs to find a basis in § 506 to justify voiding any portion of the
lien. Brief for Appellee at *20-21 Ryan v. Homecomings Fin. Network, 253 F.3d 778 (4th
Cir. 2001) (No. 00-2137) (“Consequently, Nobelman does not stand for the proposition espoused by the Appellants that a Chapter 7 debtor merely has to show lack of equity to strip
off a wholly unsecured lien against property, nor is it evidence of a judicial evolution in the
interpretation of Section 506 as it applies to Chapter 7 bankruptcies.”).
112
Ryan, 253 F.3d at 781-82.
113
Id. at 782.
108
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The court also noted two distinct rationales stated by the Dewsnup
court which it believed to be equally applicable to debtors’ attempt to
strip off the unsecured junior lien: (1) that the mortgagor and mortgagee bargained for the lien to remain with the real property until foreclosure, and therefore “[a]ny increase over the judicially determined
valuation during bankruptcy rightly accrues to the benefit of the creditor,” and (2) absent clear Congressional intent to the contrary, it
would not be proper to create such a “broad new remedy against allowed claims to the extent that they become ‘unsecured,’ ” when traditionally, liens of this kind passed through bankruptcy unaffected.114
The court was equally unimpressed by debtors’ attempt to use
Nobelman to support their argument.115 As the court noted,
Nobelman hinges on the interpretation of § 1322—a provision of the
Code that was inapplicable to the Chapter 7 debtors before the court
in Ryan.116 Therefore it was Dewsnup’s interpretation of § 506(d)
that was relevant to Ryan.117 Accordingly, the court determined that
Dewsnup was controlling; therefore, the Chapter 7 debtors were prohibited from stripping off the wholly unsecured junior lien attached to
their residence.118
3.

Sixth Circuit: Talbert v. City Mortgage
Services (In re Talbert)119

In Talbert, the debtors attempted to strip off a wholly unsecured junior lien attached to their residence during a Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding.120 The debtors relied on similar arguments as
those seen in Ryan and Laskin.121 Interestingly, in this case, the creditors chose not to file an answer or other response in the bankruptcy
court—the lower court raised the lien stripping issue sua sponte.122
Continuing this strategy, the creditors also chose not to file an appel-

114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122

Id. (quoting Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 420 (1992)).
Id.
Id.
Ryan, 253 F.3d at 782.
Id. at 783.
344 F.3d 555 (6th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 556.
Id. at 558.
Id. at 556.
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late brief when the case reached the Sixth Circuit.123 Nonetheless, the
court found that Dewsnup prohibited the debtors’ attempt to strip off
the unsecured junior lien for many of the same reasons as those articulated by the courts in Ryan and Laskin: (1) adherence to the “preCode rule that real property liens emerge from bankruptcy unaffected;” (2) honoring the terms of the loan agreement by keeping the lien
with the property until foreclosure; and (3) allowing any increase in
the value of the property prior to the foreclosure sale to accrue to the
benefit of the creditor in order to prevent the debtor from achieving a
windfall.124
4.

Summary of Rationale for the Majority View

The Fourth, Sixth, and Ninth circuits have all followed reasoning similar to that seen in Dewsnup in order to create the majority
view which prohibits the practice of stripping off during a Chapter 7
proceeding.125 First, these courts looked for any indicator that Congress intended to alter the longstanding practice of allowing real
property liens to pass through bankruptcy unaffected.126 These courts
concluded that Congress did not intend to alter this longstanding rule,
as there was no clear language indicating otherwise.127 This conclusion is supported by a broader principle, also noted in Dewsnup, that
bankruptcy serves to give the honest debtor a fresh start by destroying in personam claims against the debtor, while leaving in rem
123
Id. at 557 (“First, we must determine what consequences, if any, City Mortgage faces
for not filing a brief in this appeal. Although not a situation we confront often, on a previous
occasion, we have addressed the effects of this unhelpful and highly risky form of appellate
advocacy . . . .”)
124
Talbert, 344 F.3d at 560-61 (“The Supreme Court’s reasoning for not permitting ‘strip
downs’ in the Chapter 7 context applies with equal validity to a debtor’s attempt to effectuate a Chapter 7 ‘strip off.’ ”).
125
Id. at 556 (“Because the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Dewsnup . . . applies with equal
force and logic to the issue at hand, we hold that a Chapter 7 debtor may not use § 506 to
‘strip off’ an allowed junior lien . . . .”); Ryan v. Homecomings Fin. Network, 253 F.3d 778,
779 (4th Cir. 2001) (“Because we find that the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Dewsnup . . . is
equally applicable to ‘strip offs’ as to ‘strip downs’, [sic] we hold that a debtor may not strip
off an unsecured but allowed lien . . . .”); Laskin v. First Nat’l Bank of Keystone (In re
Laskin), 222 B.R. 872, 875 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1998) (“[W]e conclude that Dewsnup nevertheless bars the relief debtors seek.”).
126
E.g., Ryan, 253 F.3d at 782 (quoting Dewsnup for the proposition that Congress did
not intend to alter the pre-Code rule allowing real property liens to pass through bankruptcy
unaffected).
127
E.g., id.
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claims against the same debtor intact.128 Second, these courts looked
to contract law for support, reasoning that at the time the mortgage
contract was created, both the creditor and the debtor bargained for
the lien to remain with the property until foreclosure.129 These courts
refrained from altering this agreement because these terms were what
the parties bargained for when they entered into their agreement.130
Third, these courts expressed a policy concern about the potential for
an unfair outcome if the value of the property were to increase following the bankruptcy discharge.131 These courts reasoned that any
increase in the value of the property should accrue to the benefit of
the creditor in order to avoid a windfall to the debtor.132 This result
could not be achieved if the debtor were allowed to strip off the lien
during the bankruptcy proceeding.133
B.

Minority View: Strip Off is Allowed

In the years immediately following Dewsnup, a number of
district courts and bankruptcy courts had adopted the view that
Dewsnup applied only when the debtor attempted to strip down an
undersecured mortgage.134 In this view, Dewsnup did not prevent a
debtor from striping off a wholly unsecured junior mortgage.135 In128

Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 418 (1992) (discussing Johnson v. Home State Bank,
501 U.S. 78, 84 (1991)).
129
E.g., Talbert, 344 F.3d at 561 (“Also, as in the case of a ‘strip down,’ a ‘strip off’
would rob the mortgagee of the bargain it struck with the mortgagor, i.e., that the consensual
lien would remain with the property until foreclosure.”).
130
E.g., id.
131
E.g., id. (“Finally, as was true in the context of ‘strip downs,’ Chapter 7 ‘strip offs’ also carry the risk of a ‘windfall’ to the debtors should the value of the encumbered property
increase by the time of the foreclosure sale.”).
132
E.g., id.
133
E.g., id.
134
Warthen v. Smith (In re Smith), 1 F. App'x 178, 181 (4th Cir. 2001) (unpublished
opinion); Yi v. Citibank (In re Yi), 219 B.R. 394, 397 (E.D. Va. 1998); Smoot v. Wachovia
Mortg. (In re Smoot), 465 B.R. 730, 733 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2011), rev’d sub nom., Wachovia
Mortg. v. Smoot, 478 B.R. 555 (E.D.N.Y. 2012); In re Lavelle, No. 09-72389-478, 2009 WL
4043089 at *6 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. Nov. 19, 2009); Farha v. First Am. Title Ins. (In re Farha),
246 B.R. 547, 550 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2000); Zempel v. Household Fin. Corp. (In re
Zempel), 244 B.R. 625, 629 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1999); Howard v. Nat’l Westminster Bank,
U.S.A. (In re Howard), 184 B.R. 644, 647 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1995) (all finding that Dewsnup
does not apply to a debtor’s attempt to strip off a wholly unsecured junior lien).
135
Smith, 1 F. App'x at 181; Yi, 219 B.R. at 399; Smoot, 465 B.R. at 736; Lavelle, 2009
WL 4043089 at *6; Zempel, 244 B.R. at 630; Howard, 184 B.R. at 647 (all allowing Chapter
7 debtor to strip off wholly unsecured junior lien).
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terestingly, the split was so contested that even within the same bankruptcy court in New York the judges had adopted varying views.136
As the issue evolved, each court that had adopted the minority view
was subsequently abrogated when a higher court in the jurisdiction
adopted the majority view.137 However, in an unpublished opinion138
the Eleventh Circuit recently became the first circuit court to adopt
the minority view—specifically that § 506(d) allows a debtor to strip
off a wholly unsecured junior lien during a Chapter 7 bankruptcy
proceeding.139
In the minority view, the paradox of the unlucky penny arises—if, at the time of the bankruptcy filing, the home is valued at one
penny more than the amount of the primary mortgage, the junior
mortgage passes through bankruptcy unaffected.140 On the other
hand, if, at the time of the bankruptcy filing, the home is valued at
one penny less than the amount owed on the primary mortgage, the
debtor can void the junior lien in its entirety.141 This view provides
136

Compare, e.g., Howard, 184 B.R. 644 (opinion by Judge Eisenberg from bankruptcy
court in the eastern district of New York allowing Chapter 7 debtor to strip off wholly unsecured junior lien), with e.g., Pomilio v. Mers (In re Pomilio), 425 B.R. 11 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.
2010) (opinion by Judge Grossman, also from bankruptcy court in the Eastern District of
New York, prohibiting a Chapter 7 debtor from stripping off a wholly unsecured junior lien).
The split in this courthouse was recently resolved in favor of the majority view. See Wachovia Mortg. v. Smoot, 478 B.R. 555, 570 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (holding that Dewsnup is applicable and binding as to stripping off of wholly unsecured junior liens).
137
For example, courts in Kentucky and Michigan had adopted the minority view, see
Farha, 246 B.R. 547 and Zempel, 244 B.R. 625; however, these cases were abrogated when
the Sixth Circuit adopted the majority view, Talbert v. City Mortg. Servs. (In re Talbert),
344 F.3d 555 (6th Cir. 2003). Similarly, the Fourth Circuit and a district court in Virginia
initially adopted the minority view, see Smith, 1 F. App'x 178 and Yi, 219 B.R. 394, but were
abrogated when the Fourth Circuit changed course and adopted the majority view, Ryan v.
Homecomings Fin. Network, 253 F.3d 778, 779 (4th Cir. 2001). A keen eye will note that
all of the opinions adopting the minority view, cited supra note 134, were subsequently abrogated by either Talbert, Ryan, or Smoot. This means that at the time of this article, the minority view is only used within the Eleventh Circuit as a result of McNeal, discussed infra
Part IV.B.1.
138
“An opinion shall be unpublished unless a majority of the panel decides to publish it.
Unpublished opinions are not considered binding precedent, but they may be cited as persuasive authority.” 11TH CIR. R. 36-2.
139
McNeal v. GMAC Mortg., LLC (In re McNeal), 477 F. App’x 562, 564-65 (11th Cir.
2012) (unpublished opinion).
140
E.g., Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410 (1992) (not allowing debtor to avoid any portion of lien despite the fact that value of collateral was less than the amount of the secured
creditor’s claim).
141
E.g., McNeal, 477 F. App’x 562 (allowing debtor to avoid entire junior lien when primary lien exceeded value of property attached to both liens).
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“a strong incentive for borrowers with wholly unsecured mortgages
to file for chapter 7 [sic] [because] [t]hey will be able to remove these
mortgages from their properties and discharge the underlying debt, an
option that is not available elsewhere.”142
1.

Eleventh Circuit: McNeal v. GMAC
Mortgage, LLC (In re McNeal)143

In McNeal, the debtor voluntarily filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy.144 At that time, her house was valued at $141,416 and was
subject to two mortgages: (1) a primary mortgage of $176,413; and
(2) a junior lien in the amount of $44,444.145 Thus, the value of the
primary mortgage alone exceeded the fair market value of the house,
leaving absolutely no collateral to secure the junior lien.146 Accordingly, the debtor attempted to strip off the junior lien pursuant to §
506 of the Code.147 The bankruptcy court and the district court determined that Dewsnup prohibited all lien stripping pursuant to §
506(d); therefore the debtor could not rely on this provision to strip
off her wholly unsecured junior lien.148
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit determined that Dewsnup was
not on point; therefore the lower courts were not free to depart from
earlier circuit precedent clearly allowing a debtor strip off of an unsecured junior mortgage during a Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding.149
The court noted that “the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Dewsnup
seem[ed] to reject the plain language analysis” that formed the basis
for the circuit’s earlier precedent, but nonetheless required the lower
courts to follow its earlier plain text analysis because of the “im142
Bankruptcy: Eleventh Circuit Endorses “Strip Off” of Junior Liens, 42-NOV REAL
EST. L. REP., at 6. Indeed, debtors in the lower courts within the jurisdiction of the Eleventh
Circuit have already started to benefit from the McNeal holding. See, e.g., In re Bertan, No.
11–27057, 2013 WL 216231 at *2 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. Jan. 18, 2013) (noting the wisdom of
McNeal and thereby allowing a debtor to strip off an unsecured junior lien during Chapter 7
proceeding).
143
477 F. App’x 562.
144
Id. at 563.
145
Id.
146
Id. (stating that the amount of the primary lien was approximately $175,000, while the
value of the home was only approximately $140,000).
147
Id.
148
McNeal, 477 F. App’x at 563.
149
Id. at 564-65.
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portant difference between the holding in a case and the reasoning
that supports that holding.”150 Following this logic, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the decision of the bankruptcy and district courts, and
allowed the debtor in McNeal to strip off her wholly unsecured junior
lien.151
It is interesting to note what McNeal did not hold. It did not
determine whether, in the wake of Dewsnup, it may be necessary to
re-visit earlier precedent or whether the rationales underpinning
Dewsnup provided sufficient justifications to overrule earlier precedent. McNeal merely held that Dewsnup was not on point; therefore
the lower courts could not use McNeal to depart from contrary earlier
circuit precedent.152 The court’s substantive reasons for allowing
strip off are not restated in McNeal, but the court states that courts
should continue to adhere to the prior precedent set by the Eleventh
Circuit.153
2.

The Eleventh Circuit’s Pre-Dewsnup
Precedent: Folendore v. U.S. Small Business
Administration (In re Folendore)154

In Folendore, the Small Business Administration (“SBA”)
had provided a loan to the debtors, which was secured by collateral in
certain real and personal property belonging to the debtors.155 The
SBA loan was subject to a Subordination Agreement, which gave
priority to two other liens that were secured by the same property securing the SBA loan.156 At the time of the bankruptcy filing, the value of the two priority liens exceeded the value of the collateral property; therefore the SBA loan was not backed by any collateral value
in the real property.157 Accordingly, the debtors sought to strip off
the SBA lien pursuant to § 506(d).158 The court noted that the parties
agreed “that the SBA [did] not have an allowed secured claim,” and
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158

Id. at 564.
Id. at 564-65.
Id. at 564.
McNeal, 477 F. App’x at 564.
862 F.2d 1537 (11th Cir. 1989).
Id. at 1538.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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that the plain text of 506(d) rendered this type of lien as void.159
Therefore, the court expressly adopted the view that § 506(d) allowed
the debtors to void the wholly unsecured junior lien because the plain
text of § 506(d) voids any claim that is not both allowed and secured.160
3.

Reconciling Folendore and Dewsnup

Although the McNeal court declined to take the opportunity to
reconcile the reasoning of Dewsnup with the reasoning supporting the
precedent set by Folendore this is the next logical step in the analysis. In order to determine whether Dewsnup defeats the logic of
Folendore, the Eleventh Circuit would likely look to the two factors
that formed the basis for the Court’s holding in Dewsnup: (1) the
plain text of the statute; and (2) legislative history.161 Dewnsnup actually provides significant support for Folendore’s plain text analysis
because Dewsnup resolves the ambiguity in § 506(d) in favor of reading the terms “allowed” and “secured” as two separate requirements.162 Applying Dewsnup’s interpretation of § 506(d), a claim
that is not both allowed and secured can be voided using § 506(d)—a
result that is consistent with Folendore’s plain text interpretation of §
506(d).163

159

Folendore, 862 F.2d at 1538.
Id. at 1539.
161
See Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 415, 417 (providing plain text interpretation of
the term “allowed, secured claim” as used in § 506(d), and supporting this interpretation
based on Congressional intent to not alter pre-Code treatment of real property liens).
162
Id. The Court states that “respondents’ alternative position, espoused also by the United States . . . generally is the better of the several approaches.” Id. at 417. The Court states
the respondents’ alternative position, the position the Court ultimately adopts, to be as follows:
In the alternative, respondents, joined by the United States as amicus curiae, argue more broadly that the words “allowed secured claim” in §
506(d) need not be read as an indivisible term of art by reference to §
506(a), which by its terms is not a definitional provision. Rather, the
words should be read term-by-term to refer to any claim that is, first, allowed, and, second, secured.
Id. at 415.
163
Folendore, 862 F.2d at 1538 (voiding a lien when the claim is allowed but not secured).
160
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Which Viewpoint is Correct?

The route by which the Eleventh Circuit creates the minority
viewpoint, splits the issue into two subissues. The first subissue is
whether, procedurally speaking, lower courts may rely on Dewsnup
to reverse circuit precedent with respect to stripping off. The second
subissue is whether, substantively speaking, § 506(d) allows a Chapter 7 debtor to strip off a wholly unsecured junior lien.
1.

Procedurally Speaking: Is Dewsnup on
Point?

At the current time, the minority view is only in existence
within the Eleventh Circuit, and it is only because of the procedurebased rationale stated in McNeal.164 The rationale of McNeal is only
that Dewsnup is not on point; therefore, the lower courts are bound
by Folendore.165 The Eleventh Circuit follows a prior panel precedent rule which provides that “a prior panel’s holding is binding on
all subsequent panels unless and until it is overruled or undermined to
the point of abrogation by the Supreme Court or by this court sitting
en banc.”166 Therefore, even if the panel writing the McNeal opinion
felt that the time was ripe to abrogate or overrule Folendore, the panel was bound by principles of stare decisis.167 Without an en banc
review, the panel simply could not depart from the earlier circuit
precedent unless Dewsnup sufficiently undermined the earlier circuit
precedent set by Folendore.168
Looking carefully at the precise holding of Dewsnup, it becomes clear that the Eleventh Circuit was correct in observing that
the Dewsnup holding was not entirely on point with respect to the
strip off line of cases. The lien at issue in Dewsnup was secured by
some collateral; therefore, the Court spoke only as to the inability to

164

See supra notes 134-137 (indicating the abrogation of the minority view in all but the
Eleventh Circuit); McNeal v. GMAC Mortg., LLC (In re McNeal), 477 F. App’x 562 (11th
Cir. 2012) (adopting the minority view in the Eleventh Circuit).
165
McNeal, 477 F. App’x at 564.
166
United States v. Archer, 531 F.3d 1347, 1352 (11th Cir. 2008).
167
See id. (acknowledging the strength of the Eleventh Circuit’s prior precedent rule).
168
See, e.g., United States v. Steele, 147 F.3d 1316, 1317-18 (11th Cir. 1998) (“Under our
prior precedent rule, a panel cannot overrule a prior one’s holding even though it is convinced it is wrong.”).

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2013

27

Touro Law Review, Vol. 29, No. 3 [2013], Art. 15

784

TOURO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29

void a claim that is both allowed and secured.169 On the other hand,
the strip off cases are entirely distinguishable due to the fact that these cases deal with liens that are wholly unsecured.170 The plain text
interpretation used by the Court in Dewsnup indicates that § 506(d)
speaks only of claims that are not both allowed and secured, but contains no mention of treatment of unsecured liens under § 506(d).171
Therefore, Dewsnup’s holding that § 506(d) cannot void a lien that is
both allowed and at least partially secured, does not speak directly to
the case where the lien is allowed but unsecured. This, coupled with
the statement of the Dewsnup court expressly narrowing its holding
to the specific facts of Dewsnup, supports the Eleventh Circuit’s
viewpoint that Dewsnup should not be blindly applied as binding
precedent to the strip off line of cases.172
This observation is significant due to the fact that there are
currently lower courts within seven different circuit jurisdictions,
where the circuit court has remained silent on the issue, but the lower
courts have applied Dewsnup as controlling precedent in order to
hold that a debtor may not use § 506(d) to strip off a wholly unsecured junior lien during a Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding. 173 Six of
these circuits follow rules similar to the Eleventh Circuit’s prior precedent rule, meaning that prior panel precedent can only be reversed
by an intervening Supreme Court decision that is on point, or by an
169

Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 417 (1992) (“Therefore, we hold that § 506(d) does
not allow petitioner to ‘strip down’ respondents’ lien, because respondents’ claim is secured
by a lien . . . .” (emphasis added)).
170
E.g., In re Bertan, No. 11–27057, 2013 WL 216231 at *1, *2 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. Jan. 18,
2013) (allowing strip off of junior lien when there was “no equity securing the Creditor’s
obligation . . . .”).
171
Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 417.
172
Id. at 416-17 (“We therefore focus upon the case before us and allow other facts to
await their legal resolution on another day.”).
173
See, e.g., Wachovia Mortg. v. Smoot (In re Smoot), 478 B.R. 555 (E.D.N.Y. 2012)
(district court within the jurisdiction of the Second Circuit relying on Dewsnup); Richins v.
Bank of Am. Home Loans (In re Richins), 469 B.R. 375 (Bankr. D. Utah 2012) (bankruptcy
court within the jurisdiction of the Tenth Circuit relying on Dewsnup); In re Immel, 436 B.R.
538 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2010) (bankruptcy court in the jurisdiction of the Seventh Circuit relying on Dewsnup); Janssen v. Citifinancial Servs. (In re Janssen), 311 B.R. 518 (Bankr. E.D.
Mo. 2004) (bankruptcy court within the jurisdiction of the Eight Circuit relying on
Dewsnup); Bowman v. Ocwen Fed. Bank (In re Bowman), 304 B.R. 166 (Bankr. M.D. Penn.
2003) (bankruptcy court within the jurisdiction of the Third Circuit relying on Dewsnup); In
re Virello, 236 B.R. 199 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1999) (bankruptcy court within the D.C. Circuit relying on Dewsnup); In re Madjerac, 157 B.R. 499 (Bankr. D. Me. 1993) (bankruptcy court
within jurisdiction of First Circuit relying on Dewsnup).
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en banc review.174 This means that the reasoning of these lower
courts was not procedurally sound, particularly if the holding was inconsistent with pre-Dewsnup circuit precedent. These lower court
decisions applying Dewsnup to stripping off may be easily reversed
at the appellate level, particularly if the circuit courts were to find
that prior precedent within the circuit would require a different result.
2.

Substantively Speaking: Can a Debtor Use §
506(d) to Strip Off a Junior Lien?

The minority view is not only the better view as a matter of
procedure, it is also the better view in terms of substance. The majority view is based heavily on concerns other than the plain text of the
statute; it reaches the conclusion that Dewsnup bans both stripping
off an stripping down by extrapolating the policy and historical concerns surrounding stripping down and assuming that those same concerns apply equally to stripping off.175 In Dewsnup, the Court only
turned to related policy, such as the historical treatment of similar
liens, in order to resolve the ambiguity in the text of § 506(d). 176 The
Court stated that these considerations would not have been controlling but for the ambiguity in the statutory text.177
As a result of Dewsnup, the text of § 506(d) is now unambiguously interpreted in a manner that requires courts to read the phrase
“allowed secured claim” term-by-term, to refer to a claim that is both
allowed and secured.178 In Dewsnup, the Court stated that the factors
174

Adams v. Zarnel (In re Zarnel), 619 F.3d 156, 168 (2d Cir. 2010) (“This panel is
‘bound by the decisions of prior panels until such time as they are overruled either by an en
banc panel of our Court or by the Supreme Court.’ ” (citation omitted)); United States v.
Betcher, 534 F.3d 820, 823-24 (8th Cir. 2008) (“However, ‘[i]t is a cardinal rule in our circuit that one panel is bound by the decision of a prior panel.’ ” (alteration in original) (citation omitted)); United States v. Holloway, 499 F.3d 114, 118 (1st Cir. 2007) (“Only the Supreme Court or an en banc court can overturn prior panel precedent in ordinary
circumstances . . . .”); Citizens Exposing Truth About Casinos v. Kempthorne, 492 F.3d 460,
464 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (“The court is bound by its precedent absent en banc review.”); In re
Smith, 10 F.3d 723, 724 (10th Cir. 1993) (“We are bound by the precedent of prior panels
absent en banc reconsideration or a superseding contrary decision by the Supreme Court.”);
O. Hommel Co. v. Ferro Corp., 659 F.2d 340, 354 (3d Cir. 1981) (“[A] panel of this court
cannot overrule a prior panel precedent.”).
175
See discussion supra Part IV.A.
176
Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 419-20.
177
Id. (“Of course, where the language is unambiguous, silence in the legislative history
cannot be controlling.”).
178
Id. at 415, 417.
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it found controlling would not have been controlling if the statute
were not ambiguous.179 The statute is no longer ambiguous by virtue
of Dewsnup’s interpretation; therefore courts are wrong to consider
the Dewsnup factors rather than the clear and unambiguous text of
the statute in applying § 506(d) to stripping off.
As Justice Douglas once stated, “[The courts] do not sit as super-legislature to determine the wisdom, need, and propriety of laws
that touch economic problems, business affairs, or social conditions.”180 Therefore, it is not enough that policy would support reading the statute in a manner different than Congress intended, for it is
Congress who has the Constitutional authority to stipulate, through
the process of legislation, the precise nature of the rights and obligations of a creditor and debtor throughout the bankruptcy process.181
Accordingly, in addressing which interpretation is correct, the courts
must suppress the desire to pick an interpretation based on its wisdom, but rather must adhere to the law as unambiguously expressed
by Congress.
Bearing this in mind, the plain text interpretation of the
Folendore court,182 read in conjunction with the plain text interpretation of the Dewsnup court,183 favors the notion that the plain text of
the statute expressly allows a debtor to strip off an unsecured junior
mortgage. As the Dewsnup court noted, the term “allowed secured
lien” as utilized in § 506(d) is not a term of art defined by § 506(a),
but rather is reference to a claim that is both allowed and secured.184
Section 506(d) states, “To the extent that a lien secures a claim
against the debtor that is not an allowed secured claim, such a lien is
void . . . .”185 In the stripping off line of cases, there is no question
that the creditor’s claim is not secured.186 By the plain text of §
506(d), the creditor’s claim is not both allowed and secured; therefore
179

Id. at 419-20.
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965).
181
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (giving Congress the authority to establish Bankruptcy
laws).
182
Folendore v. U.S. Small Bus. Admin. (In re Folendore), 862 F.2d 1537, 1539 (11th
Cir. 1989).
183
Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 415, 417.
184
Id.
185
11 U.S.C. § 506(d) (2006).
186
E.g., Ryan v. Homecomings Fin. Network, 253 F.3d 778, 779 (4th Cir. 2001) (“The
parties agree that the second deed of trust is a fully allowed claim, but wholly unsecured as
to the property.”).
180

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol29/iss3/15

30

Mahoney: The Unlucky Penny

2013]

THE UNLUCKY PENNY

787

the associated lien is void.187 Given the role of the court as an interpreter of the law, rather than a maker of the law, all of the important
policy concerns leading to the majority view are simply not enough
to overcome the plain text of the statute, which becomes wholly unambiguous as a result of the Dewsnup Court’s reading of the terms
“allowed secured claim” as used in § 506(d).
Additionally, the minority view does not frustrate the legislative intent embraced by the Dewsnup court. The Dewsnup court construed the statute in a manner favorable to maintaining consistency
with prior treatment of debts of the kind at issue in order to resolve
the ambiguous legislative text.188 The Dewsnup court determined
that, absent clear legislative intent to the contrary, Congress did not
intend to alter the well-entrenched principle of bankruptcy law that
debts secured by interests in real property should pass through bankruptcy unaffected.189 However, while it is true that claims that were
at least partially secured by collateral in real property have historically passed through bankruptcy unaffected, the question remains as to
whether the same can be said for claims that were not secured by any
collateral value in real property at the time of bankruptcy filing. Both
of the cases relied on by the Dewsnup court in embracing the existence of the pre-Code allowance of real property liens to pass through
bankruptcy unaffected either specifically acknowledged a distinction
between a secured and unsecured creditors, or preserved the lien
based on outdated requirements of the Code that are not applicable
today.190 Furthermore, the foundation of this viewpoint can be found
within the creditors’ appellate brief, which advocated for the majority
view banning stripping down, but nonetheless limited its discussion
to secured claims.191
187

11 U.S.C. § 506(d).
Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 417.
189
Id.
190
See Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 588 (1935) (“It is true
that the position of a secured creditor, who has rights in specific property, differs fundamentally from that of an unsecured creditor, who has none . . . .”); Long v. Bullard, 117 U.S.
617, 620-21 (1886) (allowing creditor’s lien on real property to survive bankruptcy discharge because the creditor did not prove his debt or release the lien).
191
Brief for Respondent at *27 Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410 (1992) (No. 90-741)
(“[The Bankruptcy Code] recognized the right of a secured creditor to pay itself from its security . . . .” (emphasis added) (citation omitted)); Id. at *27-28 (“Thus, Section 57(h) permitted a secured creditor to participate in the distribution of the estate . . . .” (emphasis added)); Id. at *28 (“The 1898 Act contained no express provisions relating to . . . the effect of
188
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Finally, a careful reading of the legislative history indicates
Congressional desire to treat secured claims differently than unsecured claims. The House Report states, in relevant part:
One of the more significant changes from current law
in proposed Title 11 is the treatment of secured creditors and secured claims. Unlike current law, H.R.
8200 distinguishes between secured and unsecured
claims, rather than between secured and unsecured
creditors. The distinction becomes important in the
handling of creditors with a lien on property that is
worth less than the amount of their claim, that is, those
creditors that are undersecured. Current law is ambiguous and vague, especially under Chapter XIII, on
whether an undersecured creditor is to be treated as a
secured creditor, or as a partially secured and partially
unsecured creditor. By addressing the problem in
terms of claims, the bill makes clear that an unsecured
creditor is to be treated as having a secured claim to
the extent of the value of the collateral, and an unsecured claim for the balance of his claim against the
debtor.192
This portion of the House Report clearly acknowledges that secured
claims are to be treated differently than unsecured claims. This
would seem to indicate that, regardless of the pre-Code rule as to real
property liens in general, in the post-Code world, Congress intended
unsecured claims to be treated differently than fully or partially secured claims.
V.

STRIPPING OFF AND CHAPTER 13

For the purpose of analyzing the proper treatment of a lien
that is less than fully secured during bankruptcy, the fundamental difference between Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 is the impact of § 1322.193
the bankruptcy case on the lien of a secured creditor.” (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (citation omitted)).
192
H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 180-81 (1977).
193
Compare, e.g., Nobelman v. Am. Sav. Bank, 508 U.S. 324 (1993) (analyzing whether
§ 1322(b)(2) allowed a Chapter 13 debtor to strip down a lien), with, e.g., Dewsnup, 502
U.S. 410 (analyzing whether § 506 allowed a Chapter 7 debtor to strip down a lien, without
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A Chapter 13 debtor can rely on § 1322—a provision of the Code
that is unavailable to a Chapter 7 debtor—in order to modify some of
his obligations towards certain creditors.194 Section 1322(b)(2) sets
out a general rule allowing the debtor to “modify the rights of holders
of secured claims.”195 The statute then immediately creates an exception to the general rule (often referred to as the “antimodification exception”) which disallows modification of a “claim [that is] secured
only by a security interest in real property that is the debtor’s principal residence . . . .”196 Therefore, § 1322 allows a debtor to modify
the rights of a holder of a secured claim, unless the claim is secured
by an interest in the debtor’s principle residence.197
Accordingly, the legal issue central to the question of stripping off and Chapter 13 is whether the claim relating to the unsecured
junior lien is subject to modification under § 1322(b)(2), or whether it
is protected by the antimodification exception.198 Put simply, the
question is whether the junior lien is secured by an interest in the
debtor’s principal residence. If the junior lien is not secured by an interest in the debtor’s principal residence then the general rule set out
in § 1322(b)(2) allows the debtor to strip off the lien.
A.

Majority View: § 1322 Allows a Debtor to Strip Off
an Unsecured Junior Mortgage

The overwhelming majority of courts have concluded that a
debtor can use § 1322(b)(2) to strip off a wholly unsecured junior
lien.199 These courts view the junior lien as falling within §
mention to § 1322(b)(2)).
194
11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (Supp. IV 2010).
195
Id.
196
Id.
197
Id.
198
See, e.g., Lane v. Western Interstate Bancorp (In re Lane), 280 F.3d 663, 665 (6th Cir.
2002) (determining whether a debtor could modify “the rights of a totally unsecured homestead mortgagee” by using § 1322(b)(2)).
199
E.g., First Mariner Bank v. Johnson (In re Johnson), 407 F. App’x 713, 713 (4th Cir.
2011) (unpublished per curiam opinion); Lane, 280 F.3d at 665; Zimmer v. PSB Lending
Corp. (In re Zimmer), 313 F.3d 1220, 1221 (9th Cir. 2002); Pond v. Farm Specialist Realty
(In re Pond), 252 F.3d 122, 123 (2d Cir. 2001); Bartee v. Tara Colony Homeowners Assoc.
(In re Bartee), 212 F.3d 277, 280 (5th Cir. 2000); Am. Gen. Fin., Inc. v. Dickerson (In re
Dickerson), 222 F.3d 924, 926 (11th Cir. 2000); McDonald v. Master Fin., Inc. (In re
McDonald), 205 F.3d 606, 608 (3d Cir. 2000); Fisette v. Keller (In re Fisette), 455 B.R. 177,
187 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2011); Domestic Bank v. Mann (In re Mann), 249 B.R. 831, 832
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1322(b)(2)’s general rule allowing modification; not within the
antimodification exception for liens secured by a debtor’s primary
residence.200 These courts reconcile this viewpoint with Nobelman
by reasoning that Nobelman protects only the rights of creditors who
are first deemed to have a secured debt within the meaning of §
506(a).201 The debt is secured if the creditor’s “interest in the collateral has economic value.”202 A creditor’s lien on the debtor’s real
property has no economic value if there is a primary lien on the same
property which exceeds the value of the property.203 Accordingly, a
wholly unsecured junior lien is unsecured within the meaning of §
506(a) (although it is “secured by a lien on the debtor’s principal residence”) because the junior lien has no economic value; therefore the
debtor is free to modify the loan as he could any other unsecured
debt.204
Interestingly, as a procedural matter, courts that adopt the majority view are inherently acknowledging that stripping off is not precisely analogous to stripping down. If it were true that stripping off
and stripping down were the same, then the lower courts would not
be allowed to deviate from the Court’s precedent stated in Nobelman.
Although the courts do not expressly discuss this, by adopting the
view that a Chapter 13 debtor can strip off a wholly unsecured junior
lien, these courts are inherently stating that Nobelman’s precedent
prohibiting strip down does not act as precedent to prohibit strip off.

(B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2000) (all allowing Chapter 13 debtor to strip off wholly unsecured junior
lien).
200
See cases cited supra note 199.
201
E.g., Lane, 280 F.3d at 667 (“But the majority of courts . . . have declined to read
Nobelman as placing such [unsecured] lienholders in the class of claimants whose rights are
entitled to special protection under the antimodification clause of § 1322(b)(2).”).
202
Id. at 664; see also 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (2006) (defining secured claim).
203
See, e.g., Zimmer, 313 F.3d at 1221-22 (describing a junior lien as unsecured when the
primary lien attached to the same property exceeded the value of the property).
204
First Mariner Bank v. Johnson, 411 B.R. 221, 224-25 (D. Md. 2009) (“Without first
demonstrating that it has an allowed secured claim, a creditor cannot invoke the
antimodification protection in § 1322(b)(2).”), aff’d sub nom, Johnson, 407 F. App’x at 713
(“Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court.”) (unpublished per curium opinion).
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Minority View: Nobelman is Controlling;
Therefore a Debtor May not Strip Off an
Unsecured Junior Mortgage

So far, only one lower court has adopted the view that
Nobelman prohibits not only stripping down pursuant to § 1322, but
also stripping off.205 To support this view, the court points to the fact
that Nobelman stood for the protection of the rights of the creditor,
and that these rights are equally entitled to protection in the case of
an undersecured primary mortgage as they are in the case of a completely unsecured junior mortgage.206 The court reasoned that
Nobelman protects the rights of a creditor whose debt is secured by a
lien on the debtor’s primary residence, regardless of the amount, if
any, of the “equity protecting the secured creditors.”207 The court
concluded that based on the language of § 1322(b)(2) and the
Nobelman opinion, there was no reason to treat unsecured junior liens
differently than partially secured primary mortgages.208
C.

Which Viewpoint is Correct?

The correct view is that of the overwhelming majority of
courts—that is, stripping off pursuant to § 1322(b) is fully allowable,
because a lien without any equity, even if on the debtor’s primary
residence, does not fall within the antimodification exception of §
1322(b)(2).209 This view focuses heavily on the plain text definition
205

Barnes v. Am. Gen. Fin. (In re Barnes), 207 B.R. 588, 593 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1997)
(“The Debtors’ attempt to strip off the Creditor’s security interest in the Debtors’ principal
residence finds no support in either § 1322(b)(2) or Nobelman.”). Additionally, at least two
cases exist where a court has disallowed a strip off in a Chapter 13 proceeding; however,
these cases were based on procedural or substantive matters that did not address the issue of
whether § 1322(b)(2) allowed the modification of the lien. Woolsey v. Citibank, N.A. (In re
Woolsey), 696 F.3d 1266, 1279 (10th Cir. 2012) (holding that Chapter 13 debtor could not
strip off junior lien pursuant to § 506(d), but acknowledging result may have been different
had debtors’ asked for strip off pursuant to § 1322(b)(2)); In re Thompson, No. 10-00530,
2010 WL 3719943 at *1 (Bankr. D.C. Sept. 17, 2010) (dismissing motion to strip off for
failure to file as adversary claim).
206
Barnes, 207 B.R. at 592 (discussing with approval the view that “the proper reading of
[Nobelman] was an endorsement of creditor rights, where ‘rights’ were defined by state law
and the underlying contract.”).
207
Id. at 593.
208
Id.
209
E.g., Lane v. Western Interstate Bancorp (In re Lane), 280 F.3d 663, 665 (6th Cir.
2002).
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of “secured” as set forth in § 506(a) of the Code.210 The minority
view, on the other hand, attempts to embrace the policy behind
Nobelman and expand that policy to reach the similar situation of
stripping off of junior liens.211 However, courts should not allow policy to negate the plain text of the statute because Congress has the authority to legislate, even if unwisely, provided that the legislation remains within Constitutional bounds.212 The plain text of § 1322(b)(2)
allows modification of secured claims, other than those claims that
are “secured only by a security interest in . . . the debtor’s principal
residence.”213 Section 506(a) clearly indicates that a junior mortgage
lacking in any equity is not a secured claim;214 therefore, by the plain
text of these two sections, Congress did not intend to protect this type
of claim from modification as part of a Chapter 13 plan.
Additionally, recall that Justice Stevens noted that Congress
likely created the antimodification exception in order to encourage
lending in the home market.215 However, it does not necessarily follow that Congress would have wanted to entice creditors into offering
higher risk second mortgages. The recent financial crisis, which was
precipitated, in part, by the collapse of the subprime mortgage market,216 highlights the fact that not all lending in the home market is
equal; therefore Stevens’s observation about Congressional intent for
creating the antimodification exception should not be extrapolated to
mean that Congress intended to encourage banks to give high-risk
loans secured by little, if any, collateral in the debtor’s home.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The comparison between the two majority viewpoints, that
strip off is not allowed pursuant to § 506(d) in Chapter 7 bankruptcy,
but is allowed pursuant to § 1322(b) in Chapter 13 bankruptcy, is rid210

See supra notes 199-204, and accompanying text.
See supra notes 205-208, and accompanying text.
212
See supra notes 180-181, and accompanying text.
213
11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (Supp. IV 2010).
214
11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (2006).
215
Nobelman v. Am. Sav. Bank, 508 U.S. 324, 332 (1993) (Stevens, J., concurring).
216
Robin Harding & Claire Jones, Fed Red-Faced as Notes Reveal Officials Failed to
Grasp Dangers of 2007 Crisis, FINANCIAL TIMES, Jan. 19, 2013, at 1, available at GALE,
Doc. No. GALE|A315424351 (stating that the crisis occurred “on the back of problems in
the market for subprime mortgage loans . . . .”).
211
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dled with contradictions and inconsistences. First, as a matter of procedure, courts treat Dewsnup as binding with respect to stripping off,
while failing to treat Nobelman as binding with respect to stripping
off. The majority view with respect to Chapter 7 is premised on the
notion that Court’s prohibition on stripping down is precisely on
point to the similar situation of stripping off; therefore Dewsnup prohibits both stripping down and stripping off in Chapter 7 proceedings.217 Conversely, the majority view with respect to Chapter 13 is
premised on the notion that the Court’s prohibition on stripping down
is not precisely on point to the similar situation of stripping off; therefore Nobelman prevents only stripping down of junior mortgages
while leaving open the question of stripping off.218
Furthermore, as a matter of substance, the two majority viewpoints treat the Code’s definition of “secured” in a conflicting fashion. The majority view in Chapter 13 carefully reads the plain text of
§ 506(a) to mean a junior lien with no economic value is to be treated
as unsecured for the purposes of § 1322(b).219 Conversely, the majority view in Chapter 7 carefully reads the plain text of § 506(a) to indicate that a junior lien with no economic value should be treated as a
claim that is secured for the purposes of § 506(d).220
In order to reconcile these procedural and substantive conflicts, courts should focus first and foremost on the plain text of the
Code, as interpreted by Dewsnup and Nobelman. This analysis
would lead to the conclusion that a junior lien that is secured by collateral lacking in any economic value is unsecured within the meaning of § 506(a). Following this, the plain text of § 506(d), as interpreted by Dewsnup, allows the debtor to void a lien that is not both
allowed and secured. Similarly, the unsecured lien is not a debt secured by collateral in the debtor’s primary residence; therefore this
lien can be modified by the debtor as part of a Chapter 13 plan. Although certain policy implications certainly support the other viewpoints adopted by the courts, the courts are interpreters, rather than
creators, of law. As such, courts should adhere to the plain text of the
statute set forth by Congress as the first step in interpreting these
complex areas of Code. Therefore, the proper viewpoint is that strip217
218
219
220

See supra Part IV.A.
See supra Part V.A.
See supra Part V.A.
See supra Part IV.A.
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ping off should be allowed, both in Chapter 7 and in Chapter 13 proceedings, as this is the view that is consistent with the plain text of
the Code.
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